





In his late work on Christianity, Talcott Parsons obviously built upon the writings of both
Durkheim andWeber. While he departed from the idea that increasing differentiation of
the system of action did not have to threaten the unity of the system as a whole, his
emphasis on structural differentiation was also complemented by one on value inte-
gration. He believed that, especially in the New World, religion (i.e. Christianity) has
gradually become able to impose its definition of the situation in highly different, highly
heterogeneous contexts of action. In this paper, I reconstruct Parsons’ historical-
sociological analyses of the relation between Christianity and modern society. I dis-
cuss how Parsons appropriated the writings of Durkheim andWeber – in ways which did
not fully exploit the potential of some of these writings. I suggest some alternatives,
which rely less on a concern with value integration (Durkheim) but more on one with
the differentiation of meaning systems (Weber).
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I
In the latter part of his career, Talcott Parsons (1902–1979) devoted much attention to the
relation between religion and modern society. His interest in religion went hand in hand
with his growing interest in evolutionary processes of the longue dure´e. What social
scientists call the modern type of society, he maintained, does not have multiple inde-
pendent origins ‘but has originated in one specific complex, within the area broadly
called western Europe, and has been diffused from there . . . On the religious side the
area of origin of modern societies has been Christian’ (Parsons, 1978: 173). While he did
Corresponding author:




2016, Vol. 132(1) 50–61





 by guest on January 26, 2016the.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
stress that evolutionary changes of the societal system might have been ‘caused’ by a
variety of factors, and that religion itself had not ‘produced’ modern society, he also
stated that Christianity had ‘contributed a crucial complex of factors . . . [to] the
developmental process’ (1978: 174). Against the secularization theories of his time, he
argued, moreover, that Christianity continued to take modern society, especially in its
20th-century American variant, in very specific, religiously meaningful directions.
Adherence to a generalized (Judeo-)Christian framework of meaning was in his view one
of the most distinctive features of the North American world.
Overall, Parsons’ late work on Christianity has remained work-in-progress. It was
presented in a number of essays and invited papers. Although many of these manuscripts
were reprinted in the collections Sociological Theory and Modern Society (1967) and
Action Theory and the Human Condition (1978), they also bear the mark of the special
occasion for which they were originally written. Although Parsons modelled his
approach after E´mile Durkheim and Max Weber, he never devoted a monograph spe-
cifically to the subject of religion, and left no single work designed to be of theoretical
and empirical reach similar to Les formes e´le´mentaires de la vie religieuse (Durkheim,
1960) or the Gesammelte Aufsa¨tze zur Religionssoziologie (Weber, 1988). He had to
leave his work unfinished. But it still is of sociological interest – not only for Parsons’
substantive analyses of the relation between religion and society, but also for his
attempts to build and elaborate upon both Durkheim and Weber.
For his analyses, Parsons primarily relied upon a differentiation-theoretical frame-
work. He built on the idea that specialization and systemic autonomy depend on the
establishment and institutionalization of boundaries or zones of indifference. Differ-
entiation allows systems to generate their own dynamics, their own ‘functional’ logic.
For Parsons, the differentiation from the world prevented religion (i.e. Christianity)
from being absorbed in a non-religious environment, in this-worldly commitments. But
he also argued that the Christian church was gradually able to acquire an independent
position from which influence could be exerted on its secular or worldly environment.
Separated from the world, it became able to inspire a divinely ordained mission for
mankind, a long-term effort to do His will and build His kingdom on earth. In Parsons’
view, this inner-worldly activism was intensified in the Western, ascetic branch of
Protestantism, which particularly stressed the importance of human agency in creating
a Holy Community. In highly complex and highly differentiated societies, Calvinism
or Puritanism in particular were capable of providing the meaning of meaning, of
giving a religious legitimation to the ‘system-goal for the good society’ (Parsons, 1962:
148).
This paper is devoted to a critical reconstruction of Parsons’ late work on Christianity
in its relation with society.1 In the following, I will discuss how Parsons treated the
Christian tradition as a relatively stable source of ‘anxieties’ that could be taken in
different directions in different contexts, depending on a number of factors. I will pay
attention to the factors that, in Parsons’ view, constituted relevant evolutionary differ-
ences. I will also discuss how Parsons mobilized and appropriated classical sociological
traditions for his own analyses – in ways which do not fully exploit the potential of these
traditions. This reconstruction thus intends to shed light on both the possibilities and the
limitations of Parsons’ later sociology. On this basis, this paper may also constitute a
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contribution to contemporary discussions in sociology in general and the sociology of
religion in particular.
II
For Parsons, historical-sociological analyses of religion had to address ‘a special
problem’ (1967: 390). This problem especially emerged in evolutionary analyses of the
longue dure´e, which involved two or more ‘stages’ or ‘phases’ in a process of differ-
entiation. It referred to the difficulty of analytically distinguishing between the gradual
differentiation of religion from society, on the one hand, and the modes of integration of
the societal system as a whole, on the other. In his own, somewhat cumbersome prose,
Parsons described the problem as
one of analyzing the continuities, not only of the component called by the same name in the
different stages, e.g. religion, but also of the senses in which the patterns of orientation
given in the earlier stages have or have not been fundamentally altered in their significance
for the system as a whole, considering the exigencies of the situations in which action takes
place and the complex relations of this part to the other parts of the more differentiated
system, e.g. the non-religious or secular. (1967: 391, his emphasis)
Against this background, and inspired by a re-reading of Durkheim’s work, Parsons’
analyses depart from the idea that a religious individualism was inherent in Christianity
(see Parsons, 1978: 213–32). For Parsons, this Christian individualism allowed for a
‘distanced’ attitude vis-a`-vis the existing social order. In Judaism, he argued, the primary
religious concern was with the fate of the Jewish community as Jahweh’s chosen people.
In Christianity, however, ‘God was concerned with the salvation of individuals, not
simply with the extent to which a social community as such adhered to His com-
mandments’ (1967: 392). In this view, the ‘brothers in Christ’ became an association of
believers, of individuals who were ‘truly in the faith’. The early Church of Christ could
thus present itself as a social collectivity grounded on belief, not an ethnic one (a tribe, a
people). In Parsons’ terms, this conception of a church provided the theological basis for
a ‘critical step’ with regard to differentiation processes. It
constituted the differentiation of Christianity as a religious system (a cultural system) from
the conception of a ‘people’ as a social system. Given the Roman ascendancy in the secular
society of the time, this differentiation was expressed in the famous formula ‘Render unto
Caesar the things that are Caesar’s’ – that is, the church did not claim jurisdiction over
secular society as such. (1967: 392–3, his emphasis; see also Parsons, 1966a: 126; 1978:
179)
This Christian individualism did not just lead to the virtual abandonment of concern
with life in the world. The ‘brothers in Christ’ were not only concerned with their
respective personal salvations. They neither withdrew from nor positively sanctioned the
imperial Roman society of the time; they merely ‘tolerated’ it. Parsons focused on some
underlying tensions between the other-worldly and this-worldly orientations in Chris-
tianity, on the ‘dualism inherent in the whole Christian movement’ (1978: 196). He did
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not just put emphasis on the world-rejecting nature of religion, but also stressed the
genesis of the interventionist or activistic orientation of Christianity, and its ‘historic
mission’ to transform the world and build the Kingdom of God on earth. In his view, the
differentiation between religion and society did not signify the loss of religious concerns
in favour of worldly or secular interests. It provided, by contrast, the opportunity to
strengthen the significance of religion in the ‘developmental process’; it provided the
opportunity to organize the world of secular life in terms of Christian principles. Of
course, the Christianization of society depended upon a wide variety of factors, such as
the lasting political instabilities after the collapse of the Roman Empire. But increasing
structural differentiation in the society as a whole constituted in his view the most
important single development. ‘Indeed, in the larger perspective the power of religiously
grounded values to shape secular life has depended on the increasing structural differ-
entiation of religion from the organization of the secular society’ (1978: 175).
In order to illustrate his line of analysis, Parsons highlighted the symbolic relevance
of the coronation of Charlemagne by Pope Leo III. In early-medieval Europe, this
coronation made clear that the head of the church assumed moral responsibility for
the secular sphere. But it also signalled the acceptance by the worldly monarch of the
obligation to act, in his capacity as worldly leader, as a Christian. In Parsons’ view, the
differentiation of the two spheres made a new and higher form of synthesis between both
spheres possible. It allowed for the gradual institutionalization of common values in
Europe.
Church and state then symbolically shared their commitment to Christian values . . . It was
definitely a putting of the seal of religious legitimacy on the differentiation of the two
spheres and their fundamental independence from each other as organized collectivities. But
a true differentiation always involves at the same time an allegiance to common values and
norms. (1967: 396)
Parsons also discussed the development in the Western church of collective mon-
asticism (as distinguished from anchoritism) from his differentiation-theoretical point
of view. In his interpretation, the ascetic’s withdrawal from the world, symbolized by
the vows of poverty and chastity, insured the independence from secular ties. The
ascetic’s vow of obedience, on the other hand, was an institution which assured
‘selective obedience to religious authority . . . and hence protection against nonreligious
influences and pressures’ (1978: 185). The differentiation from the world thus served to
preserve the ‘purity’ of Christian faith. But, as the Benedict Order soon made clear, the
differentiation from the secular world could also be used as a basis for specific invol-
vements within the world. Although it consisted of segregated communities devoted to a
special religious life, the Benedict Order also had its this-worldly aspect. Parsons
summarized his view as follows:
The Benedictine Rule instituted a regime of secular useful work for its members, labor in
agriculture and in crafts, as a religiously valued ascetic exercise – as Weber particularly
noted. One might say that labor was no longer conceived as simply the ‘curse of Adam,’ but
as an essential component of the most fully Christian way of life . . . Fostering this
orientation, the Benedictine order was the first in a series of involvements by the monastic
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elements of the Western church with the problems, first, of firmly establishing the church in
its relations with secular society and, second, of improving secular society itself from a
Christian point of view. (1978: 187)2
Many have spoken of the Christian Middle Ages (see also Gorski, 2000). Along the
same lines, Parsons argued that medieval European societies were the first in history to
have basic religious uniformity for a very large population as a whole. But he attributed
the church’s increasing relevance for these worlds to its increasing independence from
these worlds: ‘they fundamentally differentiated the religious organization, the church,
from the secular structure, what in this special sense has been called the state’ (Parsons,
1978: 190). He also pointed to two other ‘crucial developments’ in the first centuries of
the second millennium. One was the investiture controversy between secular and reli-
gious authorities, i.e. the controversy about the control over the appointment (or
investiture) of church officials, which was eventually decided in favour of the eccle-
siastical authorities. The other was the imposition of celibacy for the secular clergy by
the Lateran Councils in the 12th century. However imperfect the enforcement of celibacy
may have been, the policy meant that no priest (including bishops or abbots, who were
often men of great wealth and power) could have legitimate heirs, so that clerical office
could not become hereditary. In an era in which the institution of hereditary aristocracy
began to dominate within the secular societies and states of Europe, the church opted for
another trajectory. ‘The imposition of clerical celibacy had been a measure to protect the
autonomy of the church from over-involvement in the responsibilities, as well as the
perquisites and privileges, of secular affairs’ (1978: 191).
Following Parsons, however, the medieval church remained strongly enmeshed in
worldly affairs and worldly responsibilities: ‘the church was so interwoven with the
feudal system that, as property holder, it also became the lord with temporal political
jurisdiction’ (1978: 191). In Parsons’ view, the differentiation between religion and
the secular world during the medieval era therefore remained ‘unstable’ (1978: 191). The
church’s allegiance could lie with the religious sphere or with the secular authority. The
autonomy and influence of the Christian church were in other words repeatedly
threatened, because the Church had to enlist worldly power in order to succeed in its
project of Christianizing secular society.
Against this historical background, Parsons argued that the Protestant Reformation
constituted a new ‘phase’ in the relation between Christianity and society, between the
cultural and the social system (e.g. 1967: 402–12). In his view, the Reformation con-
stituted ‘the culmination in the strictly religious sphere of the general trend of social and
cultural change away from the medieval system and toward modernity’ (1978: 192).
Relying foremost upon Weber’s work, Parsons thereby emphasized the relevance of two
changes: the downgrading of the distinction between clergy and laity, and the elim-
ination of the religious orders. The Protestant reformers no longer perceived the clergy as
the manipulators of divine grace, as the mediators between God and men. The distinction
between the clergy and the laity thus lost much of its religious significance. Every
individual was ‘granted’ the same, immediate kind of contact with God; the idea of
‘universal priesthood’ could be institutionalized. The abolition of the religious orders
pointed in the same direction. It implied that ‘religious merit’ became compatible with
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any ethically acceptable worldly ‘calling’. It also became compatible with marriage.
‘Luther’s marriage, from this point of view, symbolized his conviction that the fully
religious life could be lived in the ordinary status of the lay citizen and not only as a
monk or priest’ (Parsons, 1978: 306). In Protestant Christianity, religious obligations
could be discharged by laymen in lay occupations, rather than by clergy in segregated
monastic communities. From Parsons’ point of view, the Reformation ‘had emancipated
secular society from ecclesiastical tutelage and put it ‘‘on its own’’‘ (1978: 196). But he
also argued that the increasing distance between religion and the secular world allowed
for new forms of synthesis.
In Parsons’ view, the Reformation had not only led to a more stable form of
differentiation; it had not only accentuated the difference between this world and the
other world ‘to a far higher degree than had been possible in the Catholic tradition’
(1978: 196). This sharpened dualism had in his view also been able to reactivate the
interventionist potentials inherent in the Christian movement. Unlike Weber, Parsons
thus did not believe that the differentiation and specialization of other ‘value spheres’
marked the start of the rapid de-Christianization of predominant worldviews. In his
view, the religiously sanctioned, highly critical this-worldly orientation of Protestant
Christianity did not go at the cost of religious concerns. It did not create ‘problems of
meaning’ that could not be solved by the value sphere of religion. Rather, ‘the more
important change was . . . the endowment of secular life with a new order of religious
legitimation as a field of ‘‘Christian opportunity’’’ (1967: 404). This was possible
because the Protestants, notably the Calvinistic-Puritan ones, put much stress on the role
of human agency in creating the Holy Community. Differentiation from the world here
was the condition for intensified commitment in the world. For ‘the typical ascetic
Protestant’ (1978: 196), theology gave central importance to the idea of a divinely
ordained mission for man, of a long-term effort to ‘do His will’ and build His Kingdom
on earth. For him or her, secular society became increasingly accepted as a religiously
legitimate field of action.3
On this basis, Parsons also criticized the ‘symbioses’ of church and state, which had
emerged in a number of European countries in the aftermath of the Reformation. Parsons
argued in favour of the strict separation of state and church, and against the formation of
Protestant state churches (1967: 410–12). Despite the religiously grounded emphasis on
the difference between the ‘divine mission’ and the ‘human condition’, he maintained,
dedifferentiation had occurred in some (especially Lutheran) wings of Protestantism,
thereby ‘severely compromising the religious potential for reconstructing the secular
world’ (1978: 195). Unlike Weber, Parsons thus also believed that the differentiation of
religion could serve to counter or remedy the centrifugal tendencies inherent within
increasingly differentiated societies.
On this basis, Parsons moreover questioned several viewpoints raised by the secular-
ization theories of his time (e.g. Berger, 1967; Luckmann, 1991; see also Vanderstraeten,
2015a). For him, modernization did not irrevocably lead to religious decline. He rather
tried to make sense of the ‘survival’ of religion in the NewWorld – long before debates in
sociology in general and the sociology of religion in particular started to focus upon
‘American exceptionalism’. Parsons saw the genesis of ‘a further phase [in the relation
between cultural and social systems] which has come to maturity in the nineteenth and
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twentieth centuries, most conspicuously in the United States’ (1967: 412). In this light, he
also provided his own idiosyncratic definition of secularization.
The concept [secularization] has . . . been widely interpreted to mean a one-way change,
namely the sacrifice of religious claims, obligations and commitments, in favor of secular
interests. The other possibility, however, should not be forgotten, namely that the secular
order may change in the direction of closer approximation of the normative models pro-
vided by a religion, or by religion more generally. (1978: 240)
For Parsons, Christianity remained closely intertwined with the American variant of ‘the
developmental process’.
While Parsons highlighted in this context that he did ‘not assert that on religious
grounds alone the development that took place in America was inevitable’, he also
stressed that ‘the religious system had the potential for this development, which was a
religiously authentic and legitimate alternative’ (1978: 201, his emphases). More par-
ticularly, he put emphasis on the genesis of specific structural conditions within the ‘new
nation’. In his view, the provisions of the first amendment to the American Constitution
(separation of church and state, freedom of religion) served to safeguard the differ-
entiation between religion and secular society. At the same time, they allowed for a new
synthesis between the two spheres. While ‘disestablishment’ led to the institutionali-
zation of religious pluralism, it also relegated dogmatically specified expressions of
religion to the private sphere. But this privatization of religious decisions – i.e. ‘secu-
larization in the usual sense which denied traditional denominational bodies any official
status’ (1978: 309) – had in the United States been complemented by the sacralization of
an integrating, overarching value system for the whole societal system. Drawing on work
of his former student Robert Bellah (1970), Parsons argued that the new secular nation
had been ‘interpreted from the very first canonical document, the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, to be a sacred entity’ (1978: 309). At a highly abstract level, he believed, such
a sacred value system could direct and control the choices made within each of the
different secular action systems. He therefore also spoke of ‘each additional step in
secularization, in the sense of the institutionalization of Christian patterns in the secular
world’ (1978: 261).
Following Parsons, the increasing differentiation of other systems from religion was
met by processes of differentiation within religion. Within the system of religion, he
emphasized the development of a distinction ‘between the aspect of devotion and
worship on the one hand, and the aspect of the Christian’s relation to his fellow men on
the other’ (1967: 393).4 While the ‘Christian community was constituted by the fact of
common faith and common worship’, there also emerged more generalized religious
values which served to bind ‘the community [as a whole] together in bonds of human
mutuality’ (1967: 393; see also Parsons, 2007: 104–5). Parsons saw such ideals of
‘brotherly love’ being institutionalized in a number of contexts – especially ‘in North
America, although also in other places’ (1978: 199). Like Durkheim, Parsons especially
underlined the socially integrative function of religion.
To put it somewhat differently: Parsons emphasized, on the one hand, increasing
structural differentiation at the societal level: ‘residence, socioeconomic status,
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occupation, and political attachment have become increasingly dissociated from reli-
gious affiliation and from the ethnic components which have historically been so closely
associated with religion’ (1978: 204). This differentiation and dissociation of roles made
it feasible to separate members and non-members of religious associations without using
other roles (e.g. citizenship) as a point of reference. It made it feasible to think of par-
ticipation in religious associations as a matter of private choice. But the privatization of
denominationally specific religious commitments did not have to endanger religion’s
significance in the American society. Parsons emphasized, on the other hand, that
increasing structural differentiation could go along with the generalization of religious
values at the level of society. In his view, increasing structural differentiation made it
necessary to generalize and ‘secularize’ the symbolic structures, which could ensure
cohesion and ‘latent pattern maintenance’. In his idiosyncratic view, ‘secularization’ had
to counter the centrifugal tendencies inherent in a differentiated society. It had to
safeguard the ‘systemness’ of the American society. In this regard, Durkheim clearly
provided the analytical tools in Parsons’ struggle with Weber. America’s civil religion
was thought to be the source of general images of order and more specific societal
values, crucial to maintaining minimal societal coherence (see also Warner, 1993, 1997;
Lechner, 1997, 1998; Vanderstraeten, 2002).
Against this background, Parsons claimed on a number of occasions that the adher-
ence to a specific, broadly Christian ‘religious’ framework of meaning was one of the
most distinctive features of the American society of his time. ‘In our analytical terms’, he
stated, ‘Calvinism thus gave a religious legitimation to a system-goal for the good
society’ (1962: 148). He did not argue that modern society was acceptable to Christian
ethics in all detail and without any critical reservation. He believed, however, that a
consensus was emerging ‘on a broad framework of the institutions of the morally
acceptable society and on social problems to be solved’ (1978: 209). In this regard,
Parsons thus remained attached to the Durkheimian idea that religion is society wor-
shipping itself – even if he did not identify the object of worship with the American
society as it existed at his time, but with a ‘higher reality’ that set the standards which the
‘new nation’ attempted to embody. On this basis, he also speculated about the societal
impact of the protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s. He explicitly expressed doubts
about the impact of protest movements that aimed at ‘rejecting’ modern society, but he
also saw indications of an ‘expressive revolution’ at the level of the ultimate value
system of modern society (e.g. 1978: 320–2). He pointed to socio-cultural changes that
would give way to a greater emphasis on emotions within the modern, American society.
At the same time, he was prone to emphasize the necessity of a ‘systemic’ relationship
between this ‘expressive’ counterculture and existing Christian frameworks of meaning.
He also saw a clear connection between the expressive revolution and the time-honoured
Christian obligation to ‘love thy neighbour’. But it might be questioned what purposes
the ensuing broad and vague definition of ‘religion’ (viz., civil religion) served.
Perhaps this broad and vague concept of ‘religion’ prevented Parsons from ques-
tioning the lasting significance and impact of ‘religion’ in modern society. In his anal-
yses, he could also easily shift from descriptive to prescriptive statements. He did not
question that religion could have disintegrative effects, that it could lead to conflicts and
confrontations within the societal system. But he also did not hesitate to argue that
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religion had to promote the continuity of society, that it had to exclude possibilities
disruptive to this system. His theoretical framework highlighted the relation between
transitions in the process of differentiation and the genesis of new models of value
integration and systemness. For Parsons, however, the production of systemness was also
a duty for increasingly complex, differentiated societies. Thus, the boundaries between
theology and sociology here ultimately become blurry (see also Vanderstraeten, 2015b).
III
As we have seen, Parsons’ analyses built upon a differentiation-theoretical framework.
He primarily analysed the changing relationship between Christianity and society in
terms of structural or role differentiation. He distinguished between a number of ‘phases’ –
each of which was characterized by its own structural (in)stabilities. Increasing
differentiation, however, did not have to threaten the unity of the system as a whole.
Parsons’ emphasis on structural differentiation was complemented by one on value
integration. Especially in the New World, Parsons believed, religion has proved able
to deliver uniform definitions of the situation for highly different, highly hetero-
geneous contexts of action.
The structural constraints of this theoretical framework can now also be seen. In
Parsons’ interpretation, differentiation leads to differences that did not previously exist.
‘It is in the nature of the process of differentiation that what was one part at an earlier
stage becomes two or more distinct parts at a later’ (1967: 390). But Parsons did not
‘really’ address the ensuing differences and divergences in his historical-sociological
analyses. Like Durkheim, he rather put emphasis on the ‘systemness’ of the differ-
entiated parts. In the introduction to the second edition ofDe la division du travail social,
Durkheim (1930: xix–xx) had already spoken of ‘quelques rapports de parente´’ between
the main units of traditional and modern societies.5 For Parsons, too, the relation between
the older and the newer units of the societal system was unquestionable. His emphasis
was on the unity and continuity of the encompassing system. He spoke of both the
‘belongingness of compared items within the same system’ and the ‘genetic dimension
of relatedness’ (1977: 283). In this sense, systemness was part of his definition of dif-
ferentiation. Differentiation and integration were two sides of the same coin; differ-
entiation meant that differentiation and integration were concomitantly promoted.
Analyses of different ‘stages’ or ‘phases’ in the differentiation process therefore also had
to be written as analyses of transitions in integration processes.
For Parsons, as I mentioned before, the task for any sociology of religion that intended
to address evolutions of the longue dure´ewas ‘one of analyzing the continuities, not only
of the component called by the same name in the different stages . . . but also of the
senses in which the patterns of orientation given in the earlier stages have or have not
been fundamentally altered in their significance for the system as a whole’ (1967: 391).
We may, however, now conclude that Parsons’ historical-sociological analyses primarily
departed from the idea that processes of social differentiation had to be controlled and
regulated. In his view, processes of differentiation and integration had to reinforce each
other in the course of the ‘developmental process’. Moreover, as Parsons tended to
identify ‘religion’ with the principle of relatedness and order, with a sacred system of
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values that could ensure system integration, increasing differentiation could not but
enforce the societal relevance of religion. On the basis of the preceding reconstruction of
Parsons’ later sociology, however, we may question not only the fact that processes of
differentiation necessarily have to go along with shifts in the ‘patterns of orientation’ at
the level of ‘the system as a whole’. We may also question the fact that the history of the
societal significance and impact of religion primarily needs to be understood as a history
of patterns of value integration and value generalization.
Parsons, we may conclude, privileged one of the two ‘continuities’ to which he
pointed himself. Especially for the early-modern and modern era, he hardly devoted
attention to the differentiation of religion from society. He hardly discussed the spe-
cialization of religion within modern society, but rather focused on the requirements of
systemic integration. A Durkheimian concern with value integration here thus margin-
alized a Weberian sensitivity about the differentiation of religion and other ‘value
spheres’. A concern with systemness here stood in the way of historical-sociological
analyses of the specifics of the ‘problems of meaning’ with which religion is con-
fronted in the New World and elsewhere. In order to contribute to sociology in general
and the sociology of religion in particular, it may at present be more productive to invest
more effort in analyses of differentiation processes.
Notes
1. Influenced by Max Weber and Karl Jaspers, Parsons favoured a historical and comparative
approach to the sociology of religion. In his late work, he briefly discussed the evolutionary
potential of alternative conceptions and institutionalizations of transcendence across the so-
called ‘seedbed societies’ in Israel, Greece, China, and India. In general terms, he thereby
referred to ‘the philosophic breakthroughs to higher levels of generalization in the constitutive
symbolic systems of their cultures’ (1966b: 70). But his more detailed historical-sociological
analyses remained limited to the Judeo-Christian tradition (see also Parsons, 1971).
2. Elsewhere, Parsons argued that the ‘monastic movement’ led to a differentiation between the
regular clergy, which he considered to be ‘the true ‘‘upper class’’ of the church’ (1978: 305),
and the secular clergy. In his view, there emerged at that time a two-sided relationship with the
laity in the medieval Christian church. While the members of the secular clergy were seen as
the administrators of the sacraments, and hence as in control of ‘the power of the keys’ (as
Weber also liked to emphasize), no such hierarchical relationship existed between the religious
‘upper class’ and the laity. For Parsons, as we will see, the relationship between the regular
clergy and the laity prepared the ground for the elaboration of the Protestant idea of universal
priesthood.
3. Weber, by contrast, perceived the Protestant Revolution, especially in its Calvinist-Puritan
version, as the start of a general reorientation of Christianity: from an other-worldly to a
this-worldly direction. Religious callings were redirected to the secular, this-worldly sphere.
Along the same lines, Peter Berger argued at that time that Christianity has been a self-defeating
ethic. ‘Historically speaking, Christianity has been its own gravedigger’ (Berger, 1967: 129).
As we will see in more detail, Parsons relied on Durkheim’s view on religion/society to counter
the pessimistic worldview of Weber and other critics of modernization.
4. Parsons’ own self-characterization echoed this analysis; he combined his defence of American
institutions with minimal formal religious commitments. In a letter to Eric Voegelin, for
example, he described himself as ‘by cultural heritage . . . a Calvinist’ (Parsons and Voegelin,
2013: e36). In the posthumously published, unfinished monograph American Society, he also
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intertwined his sociological account of the genesis of America’s dominant value system with
fragments of his own family history (Parsons, 2007; see also Bellah, 2005).
5. The English translation of Durkheim’s classic work by W.D. Halls misses the point. ‘Quelques
rapports de parente´’ [i.e. ‘some relations of parenthood’] is here translated as ‘not wholly
unconnected’ (1984: xlv). Like Durkheim, Parsons underlined the special, systemic and genetic
relations between the differentiated parts of the whole. As a result, he could easily identify the
process of differentiation with progress or growth, as well.
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